Obtain the data you need to make the most informed decisions by accessing our extensive portfolio of information, analytics, and expertise. Sign in to the product or service center of your choice.
US President Joe Biden announced on 5 February an end to US
support for Saudi offensive operations in the war in Yemen,
including some specific arms sales to Saudi Arabia, though it is
not yet clear what these will be.
Biden's remarks suggest that the new US administration's
priority in Yemen is to reduce the impact of the Saudi-led
intervention on the civilian population. Despite the
change in posture, President Biden stated that the United States
would continue to support Saudi Arabia defending its sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and its people from missile and unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks from "Iranian supplied forces", an
implicit reference to the Yemen-based Ansar Allah movement (better
known as the Houthis). Biden also stated that counter-terrorism
operations targeting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) would
not end.
Since the announcement, the US administration has released no
details on what support to Saudi Arabia-led coalition forces in
Yemen it plans to end. It is likely that the US will meaningfully
reduce sales of air-to-ground munitions, refuelling aircraft, and
other logistic and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia, and seek
reassurances from Saudi Arabia that these weapons will not be used
against civilians in Yemen, which has attracted strong criticism
from rights groups and international organisations. The US will
also most likely continue to provide Saudi Arabia with air-defence
systems and support targeted operations in Yemen aimed at degrading
Houthi ballistic missile and UAV capabilities, including increasing
US Navy patrols in the Red Sea aimed at intercepting weapons
supplies from Iran to the Houthis.
Biden's announcement is likely to be followed by a
review of the Houthi's designation as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) by former President Trump. President
Biden stated that the US would seek a more active role in ending
the conflict in Yemen and named career diplomat Timothy Lenderking
(former deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia)
as special envoy to Yemen. The US administration's next move will
likely be a review of the Houthi's FTO designation, with the State
Department having already suspended sanctions against the movement
until 26 February.
The US strategy is likely to remove the designation and maintain
targeted sanctions on senior and mid-ranking Houthi military
leaders, but cancel those targeting senior political figures,
especially those involved in previous negotiations, with the aim of
keeping a diplomatic channel open and, eventually, isolating
hardcore elements and dividing the movement.
The reduction in US support for the Saudi coalition, and
potential removal of the Houthi's FTO designation, are unlikely to
improve the prospects of a negotiated end to the war in
Yemen. The internationally recognised Yemeni government
currently based in Aden remains firm in its commitment to restoring
its sovereignty over all Yemeni territory, as provided by UN
Resolution 2216 (2015), which is the legal basis of the Saudi
intervention. The Houthi have, however, almost full control of
northern Yemen, and are unlikely to accept any compromise agreement
that does not include the recognition of their territorial gains.
Instead, IHS Markit assesses that they are likely to push to
further expand the territory under their control. The movement has
exploited previous ceasefire agreements to regroup, and is likely
to consider the reduced US support for the Saudi-led coalition as a
new opportunity to escalate against Yemeni forces and continue to
target Saudi territory. Further Houthi cross-border attacks into
Saudi Arabia and offensive operations targeting Saudi coalition
vessels and commercial shipping in the Red Sea are also likely, and
would test the US's stated commitment to defend Saudi
sovereignty.
Posted 22 February 2021 by Mr. Ludovico Carlino, Principal Analyst, Country Risk – Middle East and North Africa