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There have been two main focal points of attack incidents by
non-state armed groups in Mozambique in recent years. The first,
and smaller, cluster of attacks was in the central provinces of
Sofala and Manica provinces and consisted mostly of road attacks
along the N1 highway. These were being carried out by a militant
splinter faction of the opposition Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO), known as the RENAMO Military Junta (RMJ). However, RMJ
attacks appear to have ceased since February 2021 and most
commanders and fighters have belatedly joined the demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration program.
The second focal point - and focus of this article - is in the
north-eastern province of Cabo Delgado, where what started out as a
domestic Islamist insurgency in October 2017 has since seen the
fighters pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. The pace and scale
of their attacks have increased notably in the past two years, with
the late-March 2021 assault on Palma, and associated killings of
foreigners involved in a major Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) project
nearby, receiving worldwide attention.
Analytics using metadata from a large set of security incidents
help to shed light on the current form of the insurgency in Cabo
Delgado, and aid analysts to better forecast the future risk
environment.
Islamist insurgency gains momentum
Islamist insurgents staged their first successful attack in
Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province in October 2017, after an
offensive by government forces against cells in Tanzania in May
that year forced some fighters to migrate south into Mozambique or
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Their first operation was a raid
on a police barracks in Mocímboa da Praia district. Ambushes on
vehicles and beheadings soon became an integral part of the
insurgents' tactic set and they expanded their territorial reach by
attacking new towns.
The Islamic State Wilayat Wasat Afriqqiya (Islamic State Central
Africa Province: ISCAP) acknowledged the insurgents' pledge of
allegiance in July 2020. The following month, insurgents captured
the Cabo Delgado town and fishing harbor of Mocímboa da Praia and
connected roads, thereby securing a steady revenue stream from the
taxation of illicit trade in minerals and drugs prevalent there.
Mocímboa da Praia has been a key transit point for narcotics for
over forty years, mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, that make
their way down to Johannesburg in South Africa, and then on to Cape
Town before being shipped to western Europe, the US, and other
destinations. Access to these resources has enhanced their
recruitment capability, allowing them to offer relatively high
salaries to disenfranchised locals. Increased revenues have also
allowed the insurgents to attract defectors from the Mozambican
Defence Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique:
FADM), resulting in increased intelligence leaks from the FADM as
well as greater access to arms and ammunition, while also
contributing to lower morale among FADM troops.
A timeline of attack incidents in Cabo Delgado shows an upward
trend from early 2019. Our research indicates that this is due
mainly to the abovementioned collaboration with criminal networks
in Cabo Delgado and associated enhanced revenue streams.
Since the capture of Mocímboa da Praia, insurgents have expanded
the territory under their control to large stretches along the main
N380 and N381 highways connecting Mocímboa da Praia to the
provincial capital Pemba in the south of the province. Other towns
such as Macomia, Muidumbe, and, in late March 2021, Palma, have
fallen under the control of the insurgents. Most of these towns
have been attacked several times since 2017.
Pemba has thus far remained out of the reach of the insurgents.
However, we expect to see attacks on nearby villages as a precursor
to an assault on Pemba that would follow two to three months. Pemba
has been a destination and a transit hub for most of the 700,000
internally displaced persons who have fled from the northern part
of Cabo Delgado, along with some 2,000 employees of French
hydrocarbons firm Total. All roads north of Pemba and Montepuez and
east of Mueda are under the control of the insurgents and road
ambushes are systematic, making the sea route from Palma to Pemba
the safest.
Modus operandi
Our data shows a significant spike in the number of buildings
destroyed in late 2018 and early 2019, when the most frequent form
of attack was the burning of villages, often setting fire to 30 or
more mud huts at a time. Since then, however, tactics appear to
have shifted away from razing villages to controlling territory,
increased use of beheadings, and relatively more sophisticated
assaults on larger and more strategically important towns like
Mocímboa da Praia and Palma.
Thus far, we have recorded only a very small number of attacks
using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Cabo Delgado - all
against military patrols. Likewise the use of Rocket-Propelled
Grenades, with only isolated cases around Mocímboa da Praia of a
small aircraft carrying a Defence ministry official and a naval
vessel (attacked from shore) being targeted successfully. The first
reported case of the use of mortars was also in Mocímboa da Praia,
during the assault against the town in mid-2020. Initial
unconfirmed anecdotal reports from the March 2021 assault on Palma
included reference to mortars and 'heavy weapons', something our
collection team will be seeking to verify and then reflect on our
incident dashboards.
Encroachment into areas of natural gas
operations
The Afungi peninsula in northern Cabo Delgado is the site of
Total's USD15 billion Mozambique LNG plant, which is due to start
up in 2024 and eventually produce 12.9 million tons per annum
(mtpa). It is also the site of the proposed ExxonMobil-operated
USD25 billion, 15 mtpa, Rovuma LNG project. Eni also has a presence
in Cabo Delgado.
24 February 2019 saw two attacks around 20 km from the Rovuma
construction site. In one, six workers from companies contracted by
Anadarko were injured. The other resulted in the death of a
contractor working on an aerodrome for the LNG project.
On 27 June 2020, a vehicle of a subcontractor (Fenix
Construction Services) for the LNG project was targeted near
Mocímboa da Praia, with eight employees killed and three
kidnapped.
On 1 January 2021, insurgents attacked a Riot Police (UIR)
station and the village of Quitunda, where those resettled to make
way for the LNG project had been resettled. This was within the
Total LNG project area on the Afungi peninsula near Palma, but
outside of the fenced construction site. The attack prompted Total
to evacuate approximately 2,000 of its staff to Pemba. Total
subsequently asked the government to establish a military cordon 25
kilometers from the Afungi site and announced in late March that it
was ready to start sending staff back from Pemba to the area.
However, insurgents launched a sustained attack beginning 24
March on Palma. Several dozen fatalities were reported, including
some foreign nationals from subcontractors working for Total's LNG
project. The attack is the largest to date in the insurgency and is
very likely to have required more planning and a greater number of
fighters than in previous attacks, demonstrating increased
capability. Total subsequently postponed the planned resumption of
its activities there.
Towards a more coordinated counter-terrorism
response?
The government's response to the Islamist insurgency has thus
far been weak, due largely to lack of coordination and capabilities
of the police and the FADM, assisted by several Private Military
Companies (e.g. from Russia and South Africa). The government has
also been reluctant thus far to accept offers of any direct foreign
military intervention, including from the African Union and
Southern African Development Community. However, the scale of the
attack on Palma has the potential to encourage the Mozambican
government to accept greater coordination between its forces and
the US and Portuguese forces already present in the country.
Unless the security situation changes significantly, in the next
six months insurgents are likely to attempt to capture Pemba which,
in addition to hosting Total staff and logistics, has an airport
and container port. They will likely target beachfront hotels,
government facilities, and the personnel and assets of
Non-Governmental Organisations, the Catholic Church, and the United
Nations.
Attacks are also likely in Mtwara in Tanzania, targeting public
spaces such as the market to inflict mass casualties, or against
government assets and staff. However, the insurgents would probably
not be able to capture and then hold Mtwara because Tanzanian
security forces are more capable than Mozambican forces and have
experience in fighting Islamic State-linked insurgents.
Finally, unless the security situation changes significantly,
and especially if insurgents capture Pemba, they are likely to turn
their attention west to Montepuez and Balama. These areas are rich
in ruby and graphite deposits respectively, with the insurgents
likely to seek to extort then ultimately control mining operations,
with associated risks of kidnap, injury, and death to mining staff
and subcontractors.
This is the third in a series of blog posts leveraging insights
gleaned from security incident metadata in dashboards from our
Foresight platform, following those on
Egypt and the
Philippines.
Posted 05 April 2021 by Eva Renon, Senior Country Risk Analyst, IHS Markit