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The pattern of terrorist activity in Egypt tells a consistent
story of attacks concentrated in northern Sinai (Shamal Sina'
governate) and prone to peaks and troughs closely aligned to
security force deployments. Whilst this suggests security forces
are effective in tackling the threat when deployed, the fact that
they do not have the capacity to remain on permanent deployment in
northern Sinai means the threat will re-emerge as deployments end.
Looking out to 2021, the deployment of the 2nd and 3rd Field Armies
is likely to continue without significant planned restructuring of
the field command. As a result, we expect to see a continuation of
regular attacks against the armed forces and its material assets in
northern Sinai. The data shows that attacks primarily affect
military convoys and as a result the risk of Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) attacks along the coastal highway, particularly
between Sheikh Zuweid and El Arish, is likely to remain high.
Why northern Sinai?
The main epicentre of terrorist incidents in Egypt (204, or 78%
of those recorded between 2018 and mid-2020), continues to be
northern Sinai (Shamal Sina' governate), where an Islamic State
insurgency (calling itself 'Wilayat Sinai', or 'Sinai Province')
has been ongoing since 2014. Notable though is the relative failure
of the group to expand its area of operations into southern Sinai
(Janub Sina' governorate; just 4 incidents recorded). Security
along the border of these governates was improved after the bombing
of a Russian passenger jet in Sharm El Sheikh in 2015 with more
police checkpoints, and subsequent incidents have involved
individuals crossing into southern Sinai before being intercepted
by security forces, as occurred near Ras Sidr in April 2019. The
tourist resort of Sharm El Sheikh itself has had a composite
concrete and chain-link barrier built around it. Islamic State has
been largely unsuccessful in building a foothold west of the Suez
Canal. In particular, an attack on a North Sinai mosque in 2017
that killed over 300 civilians failed to have the likely intended
effect of widening the insurgency and dividing the country's
religious groups. That attack, largely perceived by mainstream
Sunnis and militant Islamists alike as an immoral assault on
Muslims, alienated potential tribal recruits in Sinai and feed
recruitment to rival jihadist groups operating west of the Suez
Canal.
The overall number of attack incidents dropped considerably in
the months after January 2018, most likely as a result of Operation
Comprehensive Sinai - when the army increased the size of its
forces deployed in North Sinai. The trend for 2020 shows an
increasing frequency of incidents from March onwards. Behind this
is a shift in target areas for Islamic State in Sinai; the group
moved further west within North Sinai than had previously been
usual, as evidenced when militants on 21 July attacked an Egyptian
army camp in the village of Rabaa, 23 km west of the town of Bir
al-Abd and occupied at least four villages.
What types of attacks - who is targeted and
how?
There were almost as many IED attacks as all other attack types
combined. This reflects the capability of Wilayat Sinai militants
to actively target security force convoys travelling along the
North Sinai coastal highway, particularly between Sheikh Zuweid and
El Arish, the two urban centres where they are most active. This
also highlights the ongoing failure of the Egyptian military to
incorporate effective electronic countermeasures into military
convoys - probably as a result of the high cost and relatively poor
training of most of the conscript soldiers deployed in Sinai.
The data shows that security forces are the top target set in
terms of people. This is also reflected in checkpoints and military
camps being the most common and fourth most common type of building
targeted, respectively. Notably, while civilians represent the
second most frequent category of human target, they represent
approximately one third of the number of soldiers targeted. This
proportional difference probably illustrates both the failure of
terror groups across Egypt to carry out consistent or mass casualty
attacks in Egypt's cities since late 2017. Those civilians that are
targeted are almost certainly disproportionately from North
Sinai.
Bulldozers represent the joint most common type of vehicle
targeted in Egypt, along with general military vehicles. This
illustrates the extensive military engineering presence in North
Sinai, where military bulldozers are used both in an industrial
capacity by military-owned businesses located in Sinai, in ongoing
construction efforts, and in the mass demolition of civilian
housing in areas suspected of being infiltrated by Wilayat Sinai.
The bulldozers are frequently damaged by IED blasts as they travel
in convoy between North Sinai's towns and military bases.
What next?
Despite the long-term deployment of the Egyptian military in
Sinai, we assesses that there has been little indication of
qualitative improvement in the Egyptian military's
counter-insurgency strategy over the course of 2020 that would
suggest a significant reduction in operations for the Islamic State
in Sinai. Although militant capabilities have not returned to the
levels of sophistication seen from 2014-16, the group has shown it
still retains high level capabilities. At least three vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) were used in an attack on a
military checkpoint in August 2020; IHS Markit data shows that this
was the first time they had been used in northern Sinai since
August 2018. Additionally, one of the militants detonated an
explosive vest - the first recorded use of such equipment since
October 2019.
The poor capability training and equipment of Egyptian conscript
troops has likely contributed to the operational successes of
Wilayat Sinai militants. Poor co-ordination between the Egyptian
Second and Third Field Armies in Sinai is not expected to improve
without significant reshuffling of senior military personnel and
the introduction of new doctrine and tactics.
Islamic State cells will probably attempt to carry out
low-capability attacks outside of the Sinai Peninsula, involving
shootings, suicide bombings, or vehicle rammings. Targets in Cairo
and Alexandria are likely to be a priority for this but will
probably remain largely aspirational with security forces likely at
highest risk. Such attacks, if they take place, are likely to be
unsophisticated and targeting security forces, involving shooting
attacks, primitive IEDs, and thrown incendiaries on isolated
checkpoints and police convoys in the poorer parts of Egypt's urban
areas, particularly in Cairo's Shubra El-Kheima, Helwan, and Imbaba
districts. Coptic Christian targets are also likely to remain a
priority, but are likely to benefit from greater surveillance and
security protection.
A resurgence of militant activity to the west of the Sinai
Peninsula would increase the risk of attacks against shipping in
the Suez Canal, and the Egypt Gas Pipeline (operated by a
consortium including Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company and
Egyptian Natural Gas Company). The canal is policed by the military
with checkpoints every 20 km monitored by helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft. Although Wilayat Sinai has demonstrated
possession and the capability to use advanced weapons such as
anti-tank guided missiles or man-portable air-defence systems -
most recently in an anti-tank missile attack on a grounded
helicopter at El Arish Airport in 2017 - the use of such systems in
Sinai has dropped off in recent years. The main damage done by such
attacks would probably be psychological, eroding commercial
confidence in the adequacy of security measures and incurring
additional security costs, even when attacks are unsuccessful, and
they would be unlikely to significantly damage a major vessel. Such
an attack would be unlikely to result in long-term re-routing of
vessels around Africa but would almost certainly raise the cost of
insuring Canal transit.
Posted 18 December 2020 by Jack A. Kennedy, Senior Analyst, Country Risk – Middle East and North Africa, IHS Markit