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Our data analysis has identified key patterns in jihadist
terrorism in the Sahel regional countries of Burkina Faso, Chad,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria since 2015.
IHS Markit's intelligence event database demonstrates a steep
rise in jihadist terrorism from 2015 to 2017, with the overall
number of attacks and fatalities in Sahel countries increasing by
80.2% and 62.5% respectively.
The increase in attacks is accounted for by the merger of local
jihadist groups, representing different ethnic groups, under the
banner of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), as well as
the territorial demise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq since
mid-2017.
JNIM is likely to increasingly shift its target set across the
Sahel, focusing less on soft targets such as hotels and similar
venues frequented by expatriates, and more on national and
international government and security forces.
Our data shows an overall rise in the rate of jihadist attacks
across the six Sahel countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria since 2015. The number of attacks
was 163 in January 2015, which rose to 781 in May 2018.
Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has successfully expanded its
presence in the Sahel region. This was predominantly facilitated by
the merging of jihadist groups' activities in the Sahel and
encouraged by the territorial demise of the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria as of mid-2017, which has led Islamist militants to seek
new destinations to relocate to. The political instability in Libya
provided the necessary conditions for the transit of both jihadists
and arms into the Sahel, facilitated by the country's poorly
guarded desert border. Moreover, AQIM has taken advantage of
existing trafficking routes in desert and forest areas across the
region.
Counter-terrorism operations encouraging pooling of
jihadists under JNIM
IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) notes that, from
2015 to 2017, the overall number of attacks and fatalities in these
Sahel areas increased by 80.2% and 62.5%, respectively. The
increased frequency of attacks in the Sahel region indicates that
several jihadist groups are co-operating. This is most probably due
to the protests for a peace accord in Mali that jihadists intend to
prevent and to the stepping up of counter-terrorism operations in
Sahel, such as the French military Operation 'Barkhane', and the
joint force of the group of five Sahel countries (G5 Sahel; Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger).
In March 2017, four smaller jihadist groups operating in the
Sahel, representing different ethnic groups, merged into one
entity, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), to combat
counter-terrorism forces. JNIM, which pledged allegiance to AQIM,
gathers members from different ethnic groups, providing AQIM with
unprecedented geographical and social reach within the Sahel. This
has allowed it to expand its support networks, including social
support for recruitment, financial support, and the use of criminal
networks. For instance, in 2012, Ansar Dine's leader, Iyad Ag
Ghali, who is now heading the JNIM coalition, co-operated with the
Malian Tuareg separatist group, Mouvement national pour la
libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), to take control of the Malian
northern region. The MNLA and Ansar Dine, however, split due to the
divergence in motivations and beliefs. While Ansar Dine aimed to
establish an Islamic state in the Sahel countries, the MNLA had a
secular separatist goal. Ansar Dine has drawn from ethnic conflicts
in Mali since 2012 by ensuring Songhay and Fula groups' opposition
to Tuareg rule, leading to the MNLA's loss of control of the city
of Gao in favor to Ansar Dine.
Our data shows that, since 2017, AQIM has maintained a constant
level of attacks and that attacks by AQIM are immediately followed
by larger and more frequent attacks by JNIM. The resemblance in
attack type and close timeline suggest that AQIM is directing JNIM.
Similarly, attacks by JNIM are followed by the Islamic State's
attacks. However, this suggests that the Islamic State is most
likely seeking to reinforce its presence in the Sahel but has more
difficulty in doing this than JNIM, mainly because of the latter's
advantage in having established a wider local network of
affiliates. To be able to maintain this local network, AQIM is
likely increasingly drawing on local grievances emphasizing the
government's preferential treatment of foreign companies at the
expense of the local population.
Changing priorities
AQIM made several statements in 2017 and 2018 mainly through its
media agency, Al-Andalus, threatening countries engaged in
counter-terrorism operations, but also threatened Western
companies, particularly French, working in North Africa and Sahel
countries that they were now "legitimate targets for the
Mujahedeen". AQIM accused international companies active in the
Sahel of stealing the local wealth and maintaining the status quo,
contributing to the spreading of "poverty and unemployment".
In accordance with AQIM's threats, IHS Markit's intelligence
events demonstrate a clear shift in target set for jihadist attacks
across the Sahel, focusing less on soft targets such as hotels and
similar venues frequented by expatriates, and more on national and
international government assets and security forces. These are
predominately French counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane and
United Nations bases.
Outlook and implications
JNIM is likely to continue focusing its attacks on government and
security forces -national and international - in and around Sahel
urban areas in the six-month outlook, with the objective of testing
the response and identifying new vulnerabilities. These are likely
to include both simpler guerrilla tactics preferred by AQIM's local
affiliates, such as shooting ambushes and roadside improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) targeting security forces' convoys, as
well as more complex attacks targeting government and military
bases, potentially through infiltration, not only in capitals, but
also less well-defended cities. The G5 Sahel headquarters in
Mauritania and operational outposts are likely to present
particularly attractive targets, given reports of financial
constraints giving rise to insufficient manpower and resources.
Mali is likely to remain JNIM's organizational base mainly due
to the continued absence of state control in the country's north,
which hinders progress on implementing a peace agreement between
the government, ethnic factions, and armed groups.
Meanwhile, the proximity of military bases to airports entails
elevated shoot-down risks for military and UN civilian aircraft, as
was the case in a 14 April 2018 attack in Timbuktu. Similarly,
there is a high risk of collateral, if not targeted, damage to
parked aircraft.