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On 23 May, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev instructed the
ministries of finance and economic development to identify funding
sources for the National Projects for 2018-2024, estimated at RUB25
trillion (USD304.3 billion).
Lack of clarity on the funding sources of the "National
Projects" investment programme makes it unlikely to be implemented
in full in 2018-2024.
State contract implementation will likely depend on the
country's immediate budgetary situation; any sudden changes, for
instance, due to decreases in the oil price, would likely trigger
contract reviews, delays and cancellations.
Russian firms are likely to be prioritized over their Western
contractors; allocation of contracts is likely to be
non-transparent and biased, favoring businessmen close to the
Kremlin.
Western firms are still likely to serve as suppliers of
equipment or high technology for the implementation of the National
Projects if domestic alternatives are not present or too
costly.
On 7 May, Russian President Vladimir Putin, following his
reinauguration for another six-year term in office, presented and
authorized the implementation of the 2018 Executive Order on
National Goals and Strategic Objectives. Based on the presidential
address, the government later developed a 2018-2024 national
programme that consists of 12 "National Projects" with 150
development goals. The 2018-2024 strategic programme resembles the
similar 2012-2018 plan, which was designed and implemented during
Putin's previous term. However, the new National Projects require
significantly larger government investments: USD32 billion was
envisaged in 2012, while the 2018 plan proposes USD304 billion. Out
of this amount USD207.6 billion has been allocated in the budget
plan for 2018-2020 but sources of funding for the remaining USD79.9
billion have yet to be identified,
Key priorities have also changed, with infrastructure
development, education and health care being prioritized in 2018
(44% of all goals), while the 2012 programme focused on improved
governance, military, defense and social policies (56% of all
goals). The new National Projects are focused primarily on
purchases of equipment, capital investment and government contracts
for goods and services.
Infrastructure priorities
The largest number of goals, or almost 20%, constitutes measures on
infrastructure development, particularly regional road networks,
railways and regional airports. Of this the Russian government
intends to invest by 2024 around USD140-180 billion in the
development of the roads network alone.
Although the previous 2012-2018 national programme aimed to
attract foreign companies for road construction, domestic companies
ended up dominating the initiative. For instance, in 2017 companies
controlled by Russian tycoon Arkady Rotenberg ranked third in terms
of allocation of government contracts for road construction and
maintenance, winning tenders for almost USD1.5 billion, including
those for the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge from the
Russian Krasnodar region to Crimea peninsula.
The 2018-2024 strategic programme does not include any specific
measures to attract international companies. It aims to bring over
50% of regional roads and 85% of roads in large metropolitan areas
in line with national quality standards and to decrease the number
of overloaded roads by 10%. To boost the construction sector, the
government planned to extend the use of bank loans, not specifying
the source of infrastructure mortgages. International media
reported that China is likely to be the major investor in
construction projects in Russia, especially in Siberia and the Far
East.
The infrastructure priorities also include improvements to both
Trans Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways to increase their combined
capacity by 50% by 2024 to 180 metric tons of annual cargo
movements. The Russian government also prioritizes development of
regional airports and point-to-point air routes outside of the
Moscow aviation hub, particularly in the 13 cities with the
population of over 1 million. Currently, the four Moscow airports
combined are responsible for 64% of total air passenger movements
in Russia. Other specific goals include investments in the seaports
and in transport accessibility, both by road and railway, of the
ports.
Digital economy
The government continues to increase control over the country's IT
sector, transferring the implementation of various digital services
to local providers. From public service digitalization, which had
been stipulated by the 2012-2018 national programme, the new set of
priorities has been significantly expanded to the private sector.
With planned investments of USD21 billion by 2024, the government
plans to develop infrastructure for high-speed transmission,
processing and storage of large amounts of data and to start using
locally produced software by the state-owned companies and the
government.
Data suggests muted government spending
The latest data released by the Russian Federal State Statistical
Service (RosStat) indicate some revival in government spending in
2017. The sector rose by 0.35%. While the last year's positive
full-year results were welcome news, they were lower than the 0.62%
growth rate in 2016. Prior to that, Russian government spending
shrank by an average of 2.6% during 2014-15, when the authorities
were forced to rein in spending hit by the crude oil price collapse
and Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis, and then the
ultimate two-year recession between 2015-16.
In recent years the Russian government has been heavily drawing
from its hard currency reserve funds to meet more pressing social
spending needs, the expensive military overhaul, and supporting
state-owned large companies hit by high borrowing costs due to
financial sector sanctions. The Russian National Wealth Fund is at
USD63.91 billion as of May 2018, nearly 50% lower than its original
reserve levels. The National Wealth Fund was merged recently with
what was left from Reserve Fund, after the latter was heavily used
to meet pension payments.
While the government has not indicated if the reserve fund will
be involved in financing some of the infrastructure projects,
considering its relatively low reserves, the Russian authorities
need to look elsewhere to meet these new financing needs.
Outlook and implications
In December 2017, President Putin claimed that 93-94% of all
strategic goals listed in the 2012-2018 National Projects programme
had been achieved. Assessments by independent Russian analysts,
however, indicate that the average implementation rate was 30-40%.
The 2018-2024 National Projects set more qualitative, than
quantitative indicators (47 numerically specified targets in 2018
versus 54 in 2012) and fewer deadlines. As the funding for the new
2018-2020 National Projects is yet to be confirmed, it is likely
that multiple goals will not be implemented in the long term due to
lack of financing and widespread corruption in the sectors,
especially in construction and infrastructure.
Russian companies are likely to be prioritized as primary
contractors for the National Programme goals, especially in sectors
such as construction and infrastructure. Based on the practices of
the previous six years, it is likely that the most lucrative
contracts will be given to firms associated with businessmen close
to President Putin and key government ministers. Foreign firms,
especially from those countries that maintain economic sanctions
against Russia, are likely to be relegated to subcontractor roles
to supply equipment or technology. In case of competition between
Western firms and firms from countries viewed as friendly (such as
China or India) the latter would likely be favored over Western
firms. However, if domestic or Asian alternatives for equipment and
high-technology supply are not available, there will be
opportunities for Western firms to serve as subcontractors. This
will be especially the case with the priority projects, swift
delivery of which the Kremlin will be prioritizing for political
purposes. A proposed railway bridge to Sakhalin island in the
Russian Far East, to connect it to the Khabarovsk region on the
mainland, would serve as a potential example for such a priority
project.