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Three Indonesian soldiers were killed in an ambush by separatist
militants armed with small-arms and spears/bows in the Nduga
district of Indonesia's Papua province on 7 March. The attack was
claimed by the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (TPNBP), or
West Papua National Liberation Army, the armed wing of Papuan
separatist organization Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM).
The increased tempo of attacks indicates that some Tentara
Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (TPNBP) components have adopted a
more aggressive strategy, most notably the faction led by Ekianus
Kogoya, which claimed the December 2018 attack and was blamed by
the military for the 7 March 2019 ambush. Various Organisasi Papua
Merdeka (OPM)-affiliated factions have waged a persistent low-level
insurgency in Papua since the 1960s against perceived Indonesian
occupation and exploitation of the country's mineral wealth; the
threat has never previously escalated beyond sporadic guerrilla
operations. Notably, IHS Markit recorded 14 separatist attacks in
2018 - more than the previous four years combined - and three to
date in 2019. The TPNBP also claimed a 2 December 2018 attack that
killed 19 construction workers involved in building the 4,300 km
Trans Papua Highway, a high-profile government development
initiative linking Sorong in West Papua to Merauke in Papua.
Increased spending on infrastructure and other development
projects by Indonesian President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo is not
turning the population against the insurgents. In fact, the
government's development initiatives and the state's heavy-handed
response to separatist activism are already exacerbating local
anti-government sentiment. The 2 December 2018 attack, for example,
was conducted the day after more than 500 protesters were arrested
for participating in pro-independence rallies, and notably, more
than 20,000 people were reportedly displaced in the military
operation that followed the attack. Projects such as the Trans
Papua Highway are also viewed by Papuan activists as an attempt to
extend the state's reach into previously inaccessible interior
regions. This said, there have been no clear indications that
continued popular support for independence or at least
self-determination has translated into increased TPNBP
recruitment.
The TPNBP's reliance on traditional weapons to supplement a
shortfall of military-grade weaponry indicates that the group is
unable to properly equip its existing fighters, let alone equip and
integrate any substantial intake of new recruits. The TPNBP's
claims of several thousand members are likely to be exaggerated;
authorities have claimed that Kogoya's faction probably comprises
fewer than 50 fighters. This reflects the group's longstanding lack
of funding. The majority of funds from diaspora sources are likely
still prioritizing political pro-independence activism over
insurgent groups. Although low-level extortion has targeted some
mining operations in Papua, there are no indications that the group
has sought to tax the local population, on which it is reliant, at
least for passive, if not rudimentary, logistical and
intelligence-gathering support.
The Trans Papua Highway and the Grasberg mine (operated by
Freeport Inc.) are the primary commercial targets at risk in the
coming months. These two sites are symbolic of Indonesia's
perceived exploitation in Papua, and attacks targeting them to date
do not indicate an increasing risk to commercial assets more
broadly in the country. Given limited capability, the majority of
insurgent attacks will still focus on security forces and those
being directly deployed in construction work for the highway
project given their accessibility. Aviation risk is also elevated
for low-flying aircraft in the region because of deliberate
targeting or misidentification. Following the ambush on 7 March
2019, military helicopters recovering the bodies of soldiers were
engaged by ground fire; no major damage was reported to the
helicopters.
Indicators of changing risk environment
Increasing risk
An election win for opposition presidential candidate Prabowo
Subianto will indicate the formation of a new government that is
more likely to favor a heavy-handed military response against the
TPNBP than the current Jokowi administration.
A heavy-handed state response to TPNBP violence, extended to
political pro-independence activism and civilian population, will
probably increase popular support for militancy as the most viable
method of achieving objectives.
TPNBP operations increasingly targeting the Trans Papua Highway
will probably provoke further military deployments and direct
confrontation with insurgents and risk further alienating the local
population.
Decreasing risk
Prominent pro-autonomy/independence diaspora figures clearly
distancing themselves from TPNBP operations and use of violence
more generally will probably undermine the group's appeal and local
support networks.
Increasing international pressure on the Indonesian government
to limit its military response, particularly from Australia, the
European Union, and the United Kingdom, will encourage more
development-focused initiatives as a means to further assimilation
in Papua.
The Indonesian state moderating its military operations against
the TPNBP, thereby de-escalating the security situation and
delegitimizing the TPNBP's use of violence to achieve political
objectives, will further deter any recruitment to the TPNBP.
Posted 14 March 2019 by Deepa Kumar, Senior Analyst – Asia-Pacific Country Risk, IHS Markit and
Matthew Henman, Associate Director, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center (JTIC)