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The Ansar Allah (Houthi movement) claimed several attacks across
Saudi Arabia on 28 February. The Houthi claimed that a ballistic
missile (likely a domestically produced Zulfiqar missile) was
launched at Riyadh, with a further nine weaponised unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) at "sensitive targets" in Riyadh and six weaponised
UAVs at military targets in Abha, Khamis Mushait, and Jizan
province. The Saudi military said that one missile and three
weaponised UAVs had been used in the attacks.
No Saudi casualties were reported from the attacks and Saudi
media claimed that the ballistic missile fired at Riyadh was
intercepted by Patriot missile air defence batteries; this appears
to be consistent with video images published on social media of the
interception. Saudi media later published images of the missile
debris that had caused significant impact damage to a house in
Riyadh, and flights into King Khalid International Airport were
delayed for several hours after the interception. The attacks are
consistent with the two key drivers of conflict escalation between
Saudi Arabia and the Houthi: Houthi attempts to pressure Saudi into
reducing its role in the Yemeni civil war and, as an ally of Iran,
to target allies of the United States in the Gulf in the lead up to
a proposed renegotiated nuclear deal. Houthi cross-border attacks
into Saudi Arabia targeting aviation assets and maritime attacks
are likely to intensify, as long as the movement and the coalition
do not resume formal peace negotiations or reach an agreement for a
general ceasefire, which IHS Markit assesses as unlikely.
Houthi attacks are likely to increase in range and target set,
posing damage risks to assets in the wider Gulf. The attacks on
Riyadh coincided with Saudi Arabia hosting the Formula E
tournament, an indicator that the Houthi are increasingly likely to
launch strikes against additional prestige events held in the
kingdom. The Houthi claimed to have used Samad-3 and Qassef-2K UAVs
in the attacks on Abha and Khamis Mushait. The Samad-3 can be
equipped with explosives and has a range of 1,500 km, enabling the
Houthis to engage a large set of targets in Saudi and also UAE
territory, while the Qassef-2K has a shorter range (300 km) but can
be equipped with a heavy high-explosive fragmentation warhead that
can be detonated 20 m above a target, releasing shrapnel. Reporting
in international media that the Houthi have been building up
stockpiles of more advanced UAVs, including the Shahed-136
loitering munition, are credible, suggesting that the increasing
frequency of Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia is likely to continue
and is probably being adopted as a more permanent strategy,
particularly while the Houthi are widening their offensive against
Ma'rib.
The Houthi are less likely to directly target assets in Bahrain
but missile and UAV attacks on the United Arab Emirates are
increasingly likely. Given the proximity of the US Fifth Fleet in
Manama to Bahrain, the Houthi are likely to avoid targeting the
country directly due to fear of US retaliation. However, targets in
the UAE are at higher risk given increasingly prominent relations
between the UAE and Israel, including the berthing on 28 February
of a damaged Israeli-owned vessel in Dubai. Targets are likely to
include Abu Dhabi and Dubai International Airports, Jebel Ali Port
in Dubai, Al Dhafra Airbase, and any of the event pavilions
associated with the rescheduled Dubai Expo 2020 due to be held from
October 2021.
Posted 05 March 2021 by Jack A. Kennedy, Associate Director and Head of Desk, Country Risk – Middle East and North Africa, S&P Global Market Intelligence