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Unlike the seemingly bipolar divides of the Cold War period,
major economies - not least India, China, Brazil, South Africa, and
Indonesia - now have significantly greater economic and diplomatic
agency. These major economies are likely to be keen to capitalize
on cleavages between the US and China for their own diplomatic,
economic and security benefit.
States will co-operate and develop issue-specific partnerships
across spheres of mutual interest (interlinked supply chains,
multidimensional challenges like the climate agenda and energy
transition) and contest across spheres of national security
elsewhere (sanctions regimes, dollar supremacy, at-risk
commodities, critical minerals). We accordingly expect that the
global political system, including trade and security alliances,
will become more fluid and flexible.
Russia's expulsion from the G20 is unlikely, with most members
either against removing Russia from the group or undecided on the
matter. Only the US, Canada and Australia support Russia's
expulsion. G20 members are likely to maintain their positions,
driven by national interest considerations.
Indonesia - the G20 president for 2022 - invited Russia to
attend this year's summit, to be held on 15-16 November, and
extended a one-time invitation to Ukraine, which is not a G20
member. The Russian and Ukrainian presidents confirmed their
planned attendance.
Their presence at the November summit suggests that the
likelihood of Russia being expelled is remote. Abstentions by
Australia, Canada and the US are more likely, especially if Russia
chooses to escalate the conflict within Ukraine or in neighboring
countries.
Several G20 countries are skeptical of both the impact of
Russia's actions on the global world order, and the principle of
significant unilateral sanctions as a repeated mechanism of
opposition.
Splits within the positions of G20 are an early indicator of
increasing fault lines between countries, affecting future
political, security and trade relations that would be driven less
by ideology-based alignment.
The position of Indonesia is crucial because, procedurally, a
country's expulsion from the G20 must be communicated by the host
country. The attendance of officials from all G20 countries plus
Ukraine in the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July would likely
indicate Indonesia's ability to keep the group together.
The US, UK, Canada, EU, and allies among advanced Asian
economies have - with some degree of consensus - positioned the
economic campaign against Russia, including the imposition of
sanctions and export controls principally across the banking and
defense sectors, and against targeted individuals and entities.
Together with a wave of corporate self-sanctioning, the
government-led restrictions threaten global financial isolation for
Russia.
Consensus appears to be increasing against total diplomatic and
economic Russian isolation, driven by national interest
considerations of countries across regions.
China and India will continue to maintain strategic independence
regarding the conflict and are also highly unlikely to support
Russia's expulsion. China has provided political support for Russia
across other multilateral fora. A change in China's position is
improbable without significant trade and investment concessions
from the US and from the EU around the stalled China-EU investment
agreement. India is also unlikely to explicitly condemn Russia
given its foreign policy doctrine of 'strategic autonomy.'
Latin America's G20 member states - Brazil, Mexico, and
Argentina - have been critical of Russia's action and have
accordingly voted against Russia at the UN. However, the three
countries have refused to unilaterally impose sanctions against
Russia, taking a stance that is not aligned with the US.
The G20 is not the only platform for economic engagement between
advanced and emerging economies. Still, prospects of its rupture
represent an early indicator of the fault lines likely to shape
future security, trade, and diplomatic relations among multiple
centers of global influence. These fault lines would further
challenge the idea of an international community, with national
interests overriding ideology-based alignment.
Posted 23 May 2022 by Anton Alifandi, Associate Director, Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Bibianna Norek, Research Analyst, Europe & CIS, Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Carla Selman, Principal Research Analyst, Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Carlos Cardenas, Director, Latin America Country Risk and Forecasting, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Deepa Kumar, Deputy Head, Asia-Pacific Country Risk Team, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Dijedon Imeri, Senior Analyst, Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Jack A. Kennedy, Associate Director and Head of Desk, Country Risk – Middle East and North Africa, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Jan Gerhard, Senior Analyst Country Risk Europe, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
John Raines, Principal Global Risks Adviser and Head of North America, Economics & Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Jose Sevilla-Macip, Senior Research Analyst, Latin America Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Laurence Allan, Director and Head of Desk for Country Risk Europe & CIS, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Lindsay Newman, Director, Economics & Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Natznet Tesfay, Executive Director, Research Advisory Speciality Solutions, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Nezo Sobekwa, Africa Country Risk Analyst, IHS Markit and
Theo Acheampong, Senior Analyst Country Risk – Sub-Saharan Africa, S&P Global Market Intelligence
This article was published by S&P Global Market Intelligence and not by S&P Global Ratings, which is a separately managed division of S&P Global.
