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On 8 August, the Mozambique government announced that Rwandan
troops had retaken control of Mocímboa da Praia, a coastal town
with a port and airstrip that the insurgents had been using as a
base and probably as a trade and supply route since seizing it on
11 August 2020. In the past month, to counter this insurgency, an
estimated total of 3,300 to 4,000 troops have been deployed in the
country by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa,
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, as well as small contingents from Portugal
and the United States for training. The South African navy's SAS
Makhanda offshore patrol vessel, docked at Pemba port, is part of a
small maritime contingent including ships from Rwanda and
Tanzania.
Rwanda has taken a more aggressive stance than other countries,
with its forces retaking from insurgents and holding the city of
Awasse on 27 July, Mocímboa da Praia on 8 August, and reportedly
heading to Macomia, Cabo Delgado. The other countries' militaries
and governments have been in discussions on organizing as a
Southern African Development Community standby force (SADC-SF), but
the command structure remains undefined.
The Rwandan troops will very likely be able to secure a limited
area within Mozambique's north-eastern Cabo Delgado province.
However, it is unlikely that the 1,000 Rwandan soldiers will be
able to secure a wider perimeter due to the focused nature of their
offensive operations. If the SADC-SF achieves enough coordination
to provide support to Rwandan troops, the insurgency is likely to
lose its current level of territorial control of the northeast of
Mozambique and to be reduced to carrying out hit-and-run attacks.
Such support from the SADC-SF would probably include ensuring a
month-long presence in key cities, performing regular patrols on
the province's roads, providing intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and airpower (attack
helicopters). The insurgents will very likely fully withdraw from
Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Muidumbe districts in Cabo
Delgado province.
IHS Markit assesses that, facing the Rwandan forces' assault,
the insurgency has split into small semi-independent groups led by
Mozambican community leaders in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces
(see map). The leaders, identified by the US Department of State on
6 August and by the Observatorio do Meio Rural on 10 August, are
reportedly from Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Lichinga. It is
increasingly likely that insurgent commanders will retreat to
familiar ground as well as heavily wooded areas, including Niassa
province. The likely dispersal of the group poses a very high risk
of small arms attack and kidnapping to locals refusing to sustain
or give shelter to the insurgents, all government staff, and to all
foreigners. Within several weeks, once insurgents have established
themselves in new areas, schools, churches, government buildings
and investments associated with the government will very likely be
targeted with arson, grenades, and small arms. Near the Messalo
river and Macomia, the insurgent group will very likely attempt to
ambush mobile and isolated government-aligned forces, Rwandan and
SADC-SF and eventually seek to develop crude IEDs in these attacks.
However, the insurgents are likely to be deterred from staging a
large-scale assault on a city, due to their need to defend against
the arriving foreign forces. With the loss of territorial control
of the north-eastern coast of Cabo Delgado, insurgents have lost a
significant source of their revenues comprising smuggling, human
trafficking and drugs trafficking using sea routes. It is therefore
likely that the group will seek to take over small legal and
illegal mines to make up for the loss of revenue over the next
three-six months.
IHS Markit sources reported that small groups of Tanzanian
members of the insurgency have traveled back to Tanzania (see map),
probably having retreated and returned to their homes there
Insurgents in Tanzania are likely to face a very effective security
response. Tanzanian Inspector General of Police Simon Sirro stated
publicly that insurgents in Kibiti region would face the same
"fire" that drove them out before, referring to security operations
in 2017, when arrests and disappearances of young men suspected of
involvement in the killing of security forces' personnel and ruling
party officials were commonplace. Moreover, all settlements within
40km of Mtwara town near Tanzania's border with Mozambique have
reportedly set up community checkpoints at which travelers will be
arrested unless they provide identification documents and a valid
reason to travel.
Insurgents' tactic of avoiding confrontation with the armies
will likely lead to quick claims of victory by the
government-aligned forces. Unless the SADC-SF secures external
funding, it is unlikely to be able to sustain itself beyond six
months, which, combined with a perceived quick victory, is likely
to lead to the withdrawal of the SADC-SF in early 2022. However,
the insurgency's social roots will most probably remain
unaddressed, leading to the threat reappearing in the future.
Posted 23 August 2021 by Eva Renon, Senior Country Risk Analyst, Research Advisory Specialty Solutions, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
William Farmer, Analyst, Sub-Saharan Africa, Country Risk, IHS Markit