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A supporter of the opposition Republican Alliance for
Development (Alliance Républicaine pour le Développement: ARD),
Kako Houmed Kako, whose arrest led to two days of protests,
appeared in court on 3 November. Kako's detention on 31 October
caused violent protests in Arhiba, a district within the capital,
Djibouti City.
During the protests, youths burned tires, threw stones at
police, and erected roadblocks along Djibouti's main cargo supply
route from the capital into land-locked Ethiopia, primarily
carrying agricultural products, fuel, and salt. The roadblocks were
in place for six hours each day. Police dispersed protesters with
teargas and rubber bullets before escalating to live ammunition.
Opposition sources reported that 50 people were injured. Smaller
protests occurred in Tadjourah and Obock regions but caused
negligible disruption and the roadblocks in Arhiba have since been
dismantled.
Significance
Protests are rare in Djibouti, previously occurring only in 2015
in Djibouti City's outer Balbala district, primarily because of
pre-emptive arrests and use of lethal force by the security forces.
The ARD has no seats in the Djiboutian parliament, having boycotted
the February 2017 legislative elections, and is one of four member
parties in the Union for National Salvation (Union pour le Salut
National: USN) opposition coalition. USN members largely represent
the ethnic Afar and are very likely to co-ordinate their protest
activities ahead of the 2020-21 presidential elections, focusing on
Djibouti City, and the Afar regions of Tadjourah and Obock.
Operations at the Port of Djibouti and the international airport
are very unlikely to be directly affected.
In the unlikely event that President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh does
not step down ahead of the elections (he has not publicly ruled out
a fifth successive term), opposition demonstrators are very likely
to begin overtly co-operating with the remnants of the armed
anti-government FRUD-Armé, who are concentrated in Obock and
Tadjourah. This would increase the likelihood of arson and
vandalism targeting government-affiliated companies and property,
particularly projects in the construction and energy sectors
(especially geothermal and wind farms) that are perceived to have
expropriated large tracts of land. Another trigger for protests
would be government officials supporting the integration of
territorially disputed areas of Tadjourah around Lake Assal into
the neighboring Arta district, where several geothermal projects
are located.
