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The economic outlook for Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC) countries remains challenging, largely due to
uncertainty over containment of the COVID-19 virus pandemic and
weak, but recovering, global oil prices.
Macroeconomic challenges will increase strain on banks' already
weak asset quality, while elevated banking exposure to governments
represents a key risk to financial stability.
IHS Markit assesses that future protests in Cameroon and a
civil conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) and insurgents
will hinder reform efforts and economic recovery beyond 2021.
The economic outlook for CEMAC countries - Cameroon, CAR, Chad,
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon - remains
challenging, largely due to uncertainty over containment of the
COVID-19 pandemic and weak but recovering global oil prices. IHS
Markit expects the CEMAC economy to grow by 3.5% in 2021 and by
over 4.0% in 2022. Recovery will be uneven across the region: IHS
Markit's latest forecasts project Cameroon's real GDP growth to
average 3.5% in 2021 and 2022, and Gabon's growth to average around
2.9%, while Equatorial Guinea is likely to remain in recession
given its declining oil production, and CAR, a non-oil producer, is
to grow by about 4.5%. We forecast external demand for the CEMAC
region's goods and services to strengthen, supported by recovery in
the global economy, which we project to expand by about 4.4% in
2021 and 4.2% in 2022. IHS Markit's Dated Brent crude oil price
forecast recently improved to about USD67 per barrel in 2021 and we
expect CEMAC's important hydrocarbons sector to benefit, providing
additional stimulus to growth in the region and permitting upside
adjustments to our growth forecasts in future reviews.
Macroeconomic challenges will increase strain on banks' already
weak asset quality in CEMAC countries. The region's banking sector
has been struggling with poor asset quality since the global
decline of oil prices in 2014; non-performing loans rose from 9.1%
at end-2014 to 21.3% in June 2020 (when last reported) and we
expect impairments to continue rising given the economic challenges
caused by the COVID-19 virus pandemic. Additionally, sizeable
arrears with government payments are exacerbating the pressure on
the sector's already weak asset quality.
The banking sector in the CEMAC bloc is exposed significantly to
sovereign solvency, both directly through banks' exposure to
sovereign debt, which as of September 2020 amounted to about 15% of
total banking assets, and through government ownership of banks -
state ownership of banks within the CEMAC region represented about
16% of total banking assets as of September 2020.
Banks are also exposed to sovereign risks indirectly through
government arrears to suppliers and service providers who are bank
borrowers and depend on government payments to service their bank
loans, with delayed state payments thus increasing credit risks for
the banking sector. Banks have further exposure through state
safety-net arrangements for assets that are protected by explicit
and implicit government guarantees.
Medium-term debt sustainability requires strong commitment to
fiscal consolidation, transparent debt management, effective
resource mobilisation, and good governance. Public-sector and
publicly guaranteed debt accounts for the largest share of external
liabilities in the CEMAC region, with most of this denominated in
US dollars. The bulk of the external debt is long-dated and mostly
concessional in nature. However, in recent years, CEMAC member
countries such as Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon have contracted
commercial debt through Eurobonds, while Chad has arranged US
dollar-denominated oil-backed loans. Debt vulnerabilities have
increased given the weakening of the fiscal positions in the
region. In 2020, the region's total public debt rose to an
estimated 57% of GDP, from 52% in 2019, with external debt
increasing to about 38% of GDP, from 32%. IHS Markit forecasts the
CEMAC bloc's debt-to-GDP ratio will remain elevated at above 50%
through 2024.
In Cameroon, the sudden death or incapacitation of 88-year-old
President Paul Biya would threaten widespread protests and policy
paralysis. Power is heavily concentrated in Cameroon's presidency
and there is no clear succession plan in place to replace President
Biya, who has served for almost 40 years. His official term is due
to end in 2025. If he is suddenly unable to continue his duties,
the lack of clear succession makes policy paralysis likely until a
clear successor takes over, following a succession struggle within
the ruling party and among higher military officers. In the
country's Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions,
secessionists, largely repressed militarily by Biya's government,
would view a power vacuum as an opportunity to obtain greater
autonomy, encouraging them to organise large-scale protests. This
would strain the capacity of the security forces, making them less
able to contain likely medium-scale protests in the Francophone
regions' cities of Yaoundé, the capital, and Douala. There, the
political opposition would be emboldened by a power vacuum,
increasing the probability that it would organise protests
demanding fresh elections be held quickly. The protests would imply
a high risk of disruption to cargo transportation and trade for
weeks and some damage to assets of the ruling party and the
security forces.
In CAR, IHS Markit assesses that future protests in the capital,
Bangui, and the civil conflict will hinder reform efforts and
economic recovery in 2021. Civil war risks have increased in CAR
with the formation of the Coalition des patriotes pour le
changement (CPC) militia alliance opposed to President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra's re-election in December 2020. In
January 2021, the CPC took control of several towns on routes
leading to Bangui, but the militias would struggle to enter the
capital due to the protection and superior weapons strength
provided by United Nations and Russian troops, reducing the
likelihood of Touadéra's overthrow. Increased commodity prices,
which in some cases have tripled due to the impact of the COVID-19
virus outbreak, increase the risk of protests in market areas.
Posted 15 April 2021 by Ana Souto, Principal Economist, Banking Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Archbold Macheka, Economist, Sub Saharan Africa, S&P Global Market Intelligence and
Eva Renon, Senior Country Risk Analyst, Research Advisory Specialty Solutions, S&P Global Market Intelligence