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On 3 July, Abdelkader Bensalah, the President of the Council of
the Nation (Senate) and interim successor to President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika in the event of his incapacity, became the fourth public
official in recent weeks to call for Bouteflika to stand for
re-election in the presidential elections to be held in
mid-2019.
We assess that the government's careful management of an early
debate on Bouteflika's fifth term is most likely intended to
prepare the public for the government's likely preferred option of
an orderly succession to a consensus candidate.
Bouteflika's candidacy would be a likely 'fall-back' option if
the ruling elite cannot agree on a successor, given the risk of
country-wide protests over Bouteflika's perceived incapacity
through poor health.
Regardless of the succession issue, the group behind Bouteflika
who currently hold power are likely to seek continuity in policy
areas they consider essential for revenue recovery and maintaining
governmental control over the economy. The government is likely,
however, to make the hydrocarbon sector more attractive to
investors, while continuing its efforts to diversify the economy
towards the industrial sector
Bensaleh's statement came after similar public appeals by the
ruling party, the National Liberation Front (Front de
libération nationale: FLN), and the second and third largest
parties, the Democratic National Rally (Rassemblement National et
Démocratique: RND) and Tajamou'e Amel El Jazair (TAJ), in
March and June. Despite the impression created by Bouteflika's rare
public appearances, both the FLN and RND leaders have insisted that
he is mentally and physically fit. Other professional and civil
society groups and associations have also announced their support
for Bouteflika's candidacy. These include the Algerian religious
brotherhood "Zawiya", the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union
Générale des Travailleurs Algériens: UGTA), and the
Algerian Forum of Business Executives (Forum des Chefs
d'Entreprises: FCE).
These latest statements supporting Bouteflika are most likely
intended to counter calls in the past 12 months by the opposition
and public figures, including government officials and academics,
asking the president to step down due to his poor health. On 26
May, a group of 14 civil society members, including the former
prime minister, Ahmed Benbitour, sent an open letter to President
Bouteflika asking him not to run for a fifth term and launched a
new political movement, Mouwatana (citizenry), which they say is
aimed at creating the "conditions for a peaceful transition".
President Bouteflika has not publicly commented on his intentions.
Bouteflika's ill health means that in the eyes of the public he has
become a figurehead president.
In 2014, Bouteflika's announcement of his candidacy for a fourth
term triggered protests involving several hundreds of people,
driven by the civil society group "Barakat" (Enough). The protests,
which were concentrated in the capital, Algiers, and ethnic
Amazigh-majority (Berber) locations including Bejaia and Tizi
Ouzou, were suppressed by the security forces. Bouteflika was
re-elected nonetheless, demonstrating his continued popularity
despite his apparent poor health even at that time. He is widely
given credit for bringing an end to the civil war in 1999 and for
economic and social stability through a generous social welfare
programme, and investment projects that were enabled thanks to high
global oil prices until 2014, generating a large base of
petrodollars. Although his reputation as the politician who ended
Algeria's civil war places him beyond public criticism, there is a
widespread perception that power is exercised by a shadowy closed
circle, 'le Pouvoir', which includes his brother Said, the army and
security services leadership, and prominent businessmen.
Outlook and implications
Although the current public debate over Bouteflika running for an
additional term in office is reminiscent of that in 2014, this time
it is happening significantly earlier, approximately 12 months
prior to the ballot compared with three months, in 2014. The
sequence and timing of statements supporting Bouteflika indicate a
highly controlled debate by the ruling elite aimed at ensuring that
the outcome of the upcoming elections does not put government
stability, and the protection of their vested interests, at risk.
The elite is probably planning on an orderly succession but
retaining the option of Bouteflika staying in power if they fail to
agree on a consensus candidate. This is also aimed at preparing the
population for the latter outcome, seeking to prevent a
re-emergence of the 2014 protest movement.
If Bouteflika does not stand for re-election, the prospect of
any other candidate for success is likely to be very low without
the prior top-down approval of the ruling elite. Several political
figures loyal to Bouteflika, including Prime Minister Ahmed
Ouyahia, have stated that they will not stand against him.
Bouteflika's electoral victories, with claimed 81%, 90%, and 86%
majorities in 2014, 2009, and 2004, respectively, were the result
of unmatched political support and corresponding positive media
coverage.
The decision on his possible candidature is likely to depend on
whether his close circle of advisers can agree on a succession
plan. They are likely to assess that a succession plan is
preferable, given the higher likelihood of protests compared with
2014, given increased doubts about Bouteflika's health, and the
constraints imposed on the government's social spending by the slow
recovery of oil prices. Economic interest groups, such as one led
by prominent businessman Ali Haddad, will seek to influence the
decision to ensure continued favorable policies in key sectors,
including infrastructure, housing, and imports.
Irrespective of who is elected president, policy continuity is
likely on matters considered essential for revenue recovery and
maintaining local ownership, such as the 49/51 rule. The government
is, however, likely to emphasize tax reductions in the hydrocarbon
sector, and continuing its effort to diversify the economy by
promoting the manufacturing sector, including automotive, and local
content in terms of employment of Algerian workers, and some local
manufacturing in the supply chain. Such attempts at structural
change are unlikely on their own to successfully address the
underlying causes of discontent, especially unemployment, rendering
the government dependent on an expected rise in global oil
prices.
An indicator that the ruling elite is implementing an agreed
succession plan would be 'grooming' through media coverage and
public appearances of a potential candidate, even if he appears to
be from the opposition, but who is subsequently endorsed by the
ruling FLN party and the RDN, and 'blessed' by Bouteflika. Although
this would be an indicator mitigating government instability risks,
the dismissal or arrest, probably on corruption charges, of senior
officials or prominent businessmen inside Bouteflika's close
circle, would be a likely indicator of failure to agree on the
succession, increasing the risk of government instability.
Posted 25 July 2018 by Jihane Boudiaf, Analyst, Country Risk