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This is the second in a series of three reports examining key
conflicts in Africa in 2021. The first, on Ethiopia, ran on 11
December.
The Sahel region has witnessed an upward trend of jihadist
attacks since 2017 with the merger of several jihadist groups under
the umbrella of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which
has pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
This is despite counter-terrorism and peace building efforts
engaged by Sahel countries and a number of international partners,
most notably France since 2013.
JNIM attacks are very likely to expand deeper into
Burkina Faso and Niger around the Liptako-Gourma tri-border
area.
The most prominent hotspot for jihadist and militia activity is
tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, known as the
Liptako-Gourma tri-border area, which has become the epicenter of
jihadist activity in the Sahel. However, through 2020, the
insurgency has been spreading southwards towards Burkina Faso and
to a lower extent Niger, where jihadists have exploited poor
intelligence and weak security forces. Notable attacks have
occurred in northern, eastern, and central Burkina Faso, mainly
targeting military, police, mining, and humanitarian workers,
usually involving improvised explosive device (IED) followed up by
small-arms assaults by jihadists.
Deteriorating citizen safety, political instability and
local grievances stemming from poor governance and low economic
opportunity will likely support the jihadist
expansion.
Local grievances over chronic and long-lasting issues such as
poverty, political and security instability are likely to continue
being key drivers of insecurity. There is a correlation between the
areas with inter-communal rivalries and the number of jihadist
attacks. Hotspots of both inter-communal violence and attacks in
Mali include northern cities in and around Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu
where the leader of the jihadist group Ansar Dine, Iyad ag Ghaly,
has been advocating for the creation of an Azawad state. Ethnic
conflicts between the Dogon (sedentary farmers) and nomadic Fulani
are likely to continue in the centre of Mali, around Mopti. In
Burkina Faso, land conflicts between the dominant Mossi and second
largest group, the Fulani, is facilitating jihadist recruitment of
Fulani. Niger has been more successful at managing its ethnic
conflicts compared with Mali and Burkina Faso, probably because
successive governments have been more inclusive. Current hotspots
of violence in the Tillaberi, Tahoua regions in the west and Diffa
in the southeast, largely due to Islamic State activity.
Low likelihood of dialogue between JNIM and governments
resulting in a ceasefire in 2021.
The is growing interest in dialogue from the JNIM and the
governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Even if these are
initiated in 2021, it very unlikely that insurgents will agree to a
ceasefire. More likely is an intensification of attacks to improve
their negotiating position. There is likely to be growing rivalry
between the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (ISGS) and
AQIM-affiliated JNIM. This will likely result in attempts to assert
their respective leaderships by mounting attacks on security forces
and government targets, as well as kidnaping foreigners. France is
likely to be faced with growing regional hostility given its
opposition to dialogue and its military-centric counter-insurgency
strategy.
Posted 22 December 2020 by Jihane Boudiaf, Analyst, Country Risk
